This paper investigates the capital …nancing behavior of Chinese companies using data from 1,217 publicly traded companies listed in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering the period of 1994 to 2006. The panel regression analysis indicates that the capital …nancing behavior of Chinese …rms deviates substantially from the well-known pecking order theory. Speci…cally, the results show that for Chinese …rms, equity issues are always the preferred …nancing source over both retained earnings and debt issues in meeting their funding requirements. The results also indicate that this attitude of favoring equity …nancing is a universal phenomenon among Chinese …rms regardless of the di¤erence in their …rm characteristics. Most importantly, further analysis in the paper gives rise to a pattern of stylized asymmetric capital …nancing behavior -equity issues are used much more frequently over debt issues under the condition of a fund ‡ow surplus versus that of a fund ‡ow de…cit. This phenomenon could be the result of Chinese …rms selecting the degree of inherent equity-issue preference that is feasible to pursue given its fund ‡ow condition.
Introduction
The well-known pecking order theory developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that a …rm has a preference ranking regarding its …nancing sources. The theory argues that asymmetric information between managers and investors gives rises to adverse selection costs, associated with a situation whereby the …rm passed up a valuable investment opportunity because it was faced with issuing undervalued securities in order to …nance it. The theory predicts that a …rm uses …nancing sources in reverse order of information asymmetry to avoid adverse selection costs -i.e., …rms prefer internal to external …nancing and debt to equity if security issues are necessary.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) formulate a regression analysis to test the pecking order theory that views the issuance of equity as a residual …nancing source. They test the hypothesis that the …nancial de…cit (which occurs when the …rm's internal cash ‡ow is inadequate for its real investment and dividend commitments) should have an approximately dollar-to-dollar impact on …rm leverage if the …rm follows the theory to always issue debt, but never equity, when the external …nancing is necessary for investment funding.
1 They further note that the test can accommodate a reverse version of pecking order theory: the …rm would prefer to pay down debt but not repurchase equity when there is a …nancial surplus.
2 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) use the data from relatively large U.S. …rms for the period of 1971 to 1989 to test the hypothesis and conclude that the pecking order is an excellent …rst-order descriptor of corporate …nancing behavior. However, several subsequent studies have found con ‡icting results to challenge the pecking order theory. Frank and Goyal (2003) point out that a problem with sample selection (i.e., a relatively small sample of large …rms) might have led to a bias in Shyam-Sunder and Myers'results that support the pecking order theory. In contrast, Frank and Goyal (2003) used a broad sample (of 768 …rms) over the period of 1971 to 1998 to show that only the …nancing behavior of the largest quartile …rms in earlier years exhibited some aspects of pecking order behavior, but that such behavior disappeared over time. Chirinko and Singha (2000) caution that using the hypothesis test designed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers to evaluate plausible patterns of external …nancing can often generate misleading inferences. For example, they show that the regression results fail to reject the pecking order hypothesis even when the …rm did not follow the …nancial hierarchy of the pecking order theory (i.e., the …rm issued equity before debt or it issued equity and debt in …xed proportions, assuming an optimal debt-equity ratio exists).
There is also research seeking support for the theory by testing the implications from the pecking order theory against those from a competing capital structure theory, the static trade-o¤ theory.
3 Fama and French (2002) …nd some support for the pecking order theory based on a negative association between …rm pro…tability and leverage. However, they …nd a negative association between equity issue and the level of …rm leverage, which also lends support for the trade-o¤ theory. Graham and Harvery (2001) survey the Chief Financial O¢ cers of U.S. corporations about their …nancial behavior. They conclude that, although there is some support for both theories, the evidence in favor of these theories does not hold up well under closer scrutiny. 4 In particular, the evidence is largely inconsistent in regard to the pecking order theory, with informational asymmetry causing the pecking-order-like …nancing behavior. The consensus in the …eld has been that there is no conclusive test that can be used to evaluate whether the pecking order theory or the trade-o¤ theory o¤ers a better explanation of a company's …nancing behavior. The major di¢ culty is that the two theories share many common variables when conducting an empirical analysis. Re ‡ecting this consensus, Myers (2003) stated clearly that "there is no universal theory of capital structure and no reason to expect one".
1 They estimate a fund- ‡ow-de…cit regression whose slope coe¢ cient gives information on the proportion …nanced by debt issued of a one dollar increase in …nancial de…cits and the full support for the pecking order theory is the coe¢ cient being one.
2 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, pp. 225 ) provide a general explanation as to why the pecking order theory should work in reverse, while the associated theoretical reasoning can be derived based on Myers and Majluf (1984, pp. 207-209) .
3 See Harris and Raviv (1991) as a comprehensive survey paper that reviews the implications from both the pecking order and the static trade-o¤ theories. 4 The supportive evidence for the pecking order (trade-o¤) theory includes but not limited to that …rms value …nancial ‡exibility, and their equity issuance decision is a¤ected by equity undervaluation (…rms target a range of debt ratio, and the transactions costs a¤ect their debt policy).
In most recent years, another set of studies have turned their focus on adding modi…cations to the testing framework of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) because they argue the pecking order hypothesis based on Myers (1984) is oversimpli…ed. Lemmon and Zender (2004) re…ne the empirical analyses by taking the debt capacity constraints into consideration. They argue that a …rm has rated debt outstanding does not have debt capacity concerns constraining its …nancial choices. Consequently, the …nancial hierarchy of the pecking order theory is more likely to be followed. Similarly, Jong, et al. (2009) incorporate the debt capacity concerns in their regression analysis by separating the e¤ects of normal de…cits and large de…cits. Leary and Roberts (2008) further show that the pecking order's predictive ability begin to increase when they expand the empirical model to incorporate more factors, including cash reservoirs and debt capacity, which are typically attributed to alternative theories.
It is worthy to note that the majority of empirical studies on capital structure theories use data from industrial countries, mainly the U.S., including all of the literature that has been discussed thus far. On the contrary, there are very few studies taking an interest in examining the capital structure behavior in developing countries.
5 Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) study corporate …nancing patterns in developing countries and compare them with those in industrial countries. Both studies point out that corporations in developing countries rely more heavily on issuing equity to …nance growth than their counterparts in industrial countries. Booth et al. (2001) provide evidence that capital structure choices in developing countries are a¤ected by the same variables as in industrial countries, but there are important inter-country di¤erences in how the debt ratios are a¤ected by country-speci…c factors, such as the development of capital markets. Their …ndings suggest that the corporate …nancing patterns can be country speci…c.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether Chinese …rms have a country-speci…c preference ranking regarding their …nancing sources, and what factors may contribute to the country-speci…c corporate …nancing patterns. We start our analysis with tests of …nancing hierarchy from the pecking order theory as it is an existing theory that gives prediction on a …rm's preference for …nancing sources. We …nd that the pecking order theory is far from being a complete descriptor of Chinese corporate …nancing behavior as the test results show that: (1) debt issue is not an exclusive …nance source when external …nancing is needed for real investment, and (2) a reverse version of pecking order theory does not work at all.
Next, in order to identify if there is any speci…c type of …nancing hierarchy (other than the one proposed by the pecking order theory) that exists among Chinese …rms, it is natural to analyze how the three major …nancing sources -retained earnings, debt, and equity -are allocated to meet the funding requirement of a …rm growth. The results from the analysis demonstrate a stylized pattern of asymmetric capital …nancing behavior. Chinese …rms prefer equity to both debt and retained earnings for funding growth, and the preference is overwhelmingly stronger when facing a …nancial surplus versus a …nancial de…cit. Importantly, we …nd that this stylized …nancial pattern is robust to the di¤erences in …rm characteristics. It appears that a …rm's …nancial situation is an in ‡uential factor that drives a Chinese …rm's decision regarding how much it would pursue its given preference on equity issues over debt issues to meet a funding requirement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes sample data and provides descriptive statistics on capital structure variables in both the full sample and subsamples based on di¤erent …rm characteristics. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and reports associated test results for two analyses: (1) the pecking order's …nancing hierarchy, and (2) an asset growth regression that gives information on the portion of a funding requirement that is met with each of major …nancing sources. A stylized pattern of asymmetric capital …nancing behavior with the preference towards equity …nancing emerges from these testing results. Section 4 o¤ers a possible explanation as to why the …rm's …nancial situation is an important factor that contributes to the asymmetry in …nancing behavior discovered in section 3. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions.
We use CCER database. The raw data contains 1,388 publicly traded companies (excluding …nancial companies) listed in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering the period of 1994 to 2006. There are 171 companies'data showing some inconsistencies which include: 1. the (book) value of their long-term investment is negative 2. the (book) value of their intangible assets is negative and 3. the (book) value of their long-term liability is negative. After …ltering these potentially problematic companies out of the sample, we end up with a sample containing 1,217 companies. We use the maximum length of the data available for each company in the analysis. The longest (shortest) length of the data we have for a company is 12 years (1 year).
In the subsequent analysis, we categorize the full sample (consisting of 1,217 …rms) into three equallydivided subsamples based on three criteria-the level of …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage. The size of a …rm is measured by its mean value of total assets in all of the years included in the sample. The level of …rm growth is measured by the mean value of growth rate in total assets in all sample years. Also, the level of leverage for a …rm is calculated as its mean value of debt ratio, de…ned as total liabilities to the value of total assets, in all sample years. Note that book value, instead of market value, of total assets is used to compile all statistics in this paper. Table 1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the capital structures variables, including retained earning ratio, debt ratio, equity ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio, for the full sample and the subsamples. 6 In the full sample, the mean debt ratio, equity ratio, and debt-to-equity ratios are 50.89%, 22.01%, and 3.25, respectively. The results for the subsamples reveal several …ndings that are worthy of further analysis. First, both the equity and debt-to-equity ratios vary with respect to …rm size. In particular, there is a negative association between …rm size and the equity ratio. Speci…cally, the small-size …rms have a highest equity ratio of 30.10%, followed by medium-sized …rms at 19.90%, and large-sized …rms at 16.03%. In addition, there is a positive association between …rm size and the debt-to-equity ratio: the large-sized …rms have the highest debt-to-equity ratio at 4.52, followed by medium-sized …rm at 3.05, and small-sized …rms at 2.17. These results indicate the relative importance of using debt versus equity as a …nancing source is higher in larger-sized …rms. Second, similar to the …nding for …rm size, it is found that both the equity and debt-to-equity ratios vary with respect to …rm growth. The relation is negative for the equity ratio and positive for the debt-to-equity ratio. The result suggests that the relative signi…cance of debt versus equity to account for total assets is higher in …rms with higher growth.
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To examine one of the paper's main concerns -whether a …rm's fund ‡ow condition in ‡uences its capital …nancing choices between debt and equity, we compile the data of fund ‡ow de…cit in the last column of Table  1. 8 A clear negative (positive) association between equity (debt-to-equity) ratio and fund ‡ow de…cit level emerges, when results in both subsamples grouped by …rm size and …rm growth are compared. Using the results in di¤erent …rm size subsamples as an example, it can be seen that small-size …rms have the smallest fund ‡ow de…cit level at -$5.35 (i.e., these …rms have fund ‡ow surplus) and their equity (debt-to-equity) ratio is at the highest (lowest) level at 30.10% (2.17), while large-size …rms have the largest fund ‡ow de…cit at $35.58 and the equity (debt-to-equity) ratio is at the lowest (highest) level at 16.03% (4.52). Further, medium-size …rms have fund ‡ow de…cit of $23.35 which falls between small-size and large-size …rms, and both their equity and debt-to-equity ratios sit in the middle of these two sets of …rms as well. To further demonstrate the association between equity (debt-to-equity) ratio and fund ‡ow de…cit level, we divide full sample into two subsamples based on whether a …rm faces fund ‡ow de…cit or surplus situation. The results reported in the last two rows of Table 1 support the earlier …nding showing that the …rm group with fund ‡ow surplus at $212.66 has a higher equity ratio and lower debt-to-equity ratio than the …rm group with fund ‡ow de…cit at $172.69.
Empirical Methodology and Results
So far, evidence presented in Table 1 suggests …rms increase the relative usage of debt to equity (to …nance their total assets) when the level of fund ‡ow de…cit increases. It is, however, unclear as to whether this increase in debt-to-equity ratio is the result of a …rm changing its debt issue, equity issue, or both. The rest of the paper focuses on examining what speci…c change in …nancing choices contributes to the observed positive relationship between fund ‡ow de…cit and the debt-to-equity ratio.
Tests on the Pecking Order' s Financing Hierarchy
An existing capital structure theory relevant to our study is the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) . The theory argues that there is a cost of relying on external …nancing driven by the asymmetric information between managers and investors. This cost is referred to the situation where a …rm passes up a valuable investment opportunity because it has to issue undervalued securities to …nance it. Since the debt issue is generally involved with smaller undervalue problem than the equity issue, the theory suggests …rm prefers internal to external …nancing, and debt to equity if it issues securities.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) note that the simplest form of the pecking order theory hypothesizes that when a …rm's internal cash ‡ows are inadequate for its real investment and dividend commitments (i.e., when a …rm has fund ‡ow de…cit), the …rm issues debt but never equity.
9 Consequently, the theory predicts that the …nancial de…cit should have a dollar-to-dollar impact on …rm leverage:
( 1) where D it is the long-term debt outstanding for …rm i at period t;
is the amount of long-term debt issued by …rm i at period t; and DEF it is the fund ‡ow de…cit for …rm i at period t. 10 b po is the pecking order coe¢ cient and the supportive evidence for the theory is b po = 1.
It is important to note that the standard pecking order regression (1) assumes that …rm reaction of changing debt issues to fund ‡ow de…cit (DEF it > 0) and surplus (DEF it < 0) is "symmetric": …rms would issue (retire) debts when they have fund ‡ow de…cit (surplus). Since the evidence in Table 1 seems to suggest capital …nancing choices are di¤erent between the …rm group with fund ‡ow de…cit and that with surplus, in the subsequent analysis we will partition the standard pecking order regression (1) into cases with fund ‡ow de…cit situation and with fund ‡ow surplus situation:
We refer regression (2) as the modi…ed pecking order regression and the coe¢ cients of b D po and b S po are the modi…ed pecking order coe¢ cient under fund ‡ow de…cit and surplus, respectively. Although it has been standard in the pecking order literature to use the data of long-term debt issued for the dependent variable of 4D it , here we use three di¤erent sets of data for it: 1. change in total liability 2. change in long-term liability and 3. change in short-term liability. This approach is in response to some practitioners have noted that a considerable portion of Chinese companies'debt …nancing is short-term. Table 2 reports panel regression results on both standard and modi…ed pecking order regressions (1) and (2) for the full sample. Results on the standard pecking order regression (1) reveal that Chinese companies did substantially rely on short-term debts as much as long-term debts. This can been seen from the compatible size of estimated b P O between using 4D it = 4 long-term liability and 4D it = 4 short-term liability as dependent variable for regression (1) (0:42 versus 0:38). Since the long-term and short-term liability are equally important to capture debt …nancing behavior of Chinese …rms, in the following analysis we use total debt issued for 4D it . When total debt issued is used for 4D it , the standard pecking order coe¢ cient of b po is 0:79 (6 = 1). This result indicates that there is not a full support for the pecking order theory in the full sample. In addition, results on the modi…ed pecking order regression (2) give rise to the asymmetric reaction of debt issues to fund ‡ow de…cit and surplus situation. The regression result of b D po = 1:12 (insigni…cantly di¤erent from 1) suggests that …rms choose to entirely …nance their de…cits by issuing debts when there is fund ‡ow de…cit situation. On the contrast, when there is fund ‡ow surplus situation, the regression result of b S po being insigni…cantly di¤erent from 0 indicating that …rms do not choose to retire any of their debt. This "asymmetric" debt …nancing behavior in responding to fund ‡ow de…cit and surplus situation is not expected by the pecking order theory.
Does this asymmetric debt …nancing behavior hold for di¤erent subsamples? We run panel regression analysis on (1) and (2) for subsamples grouped by …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage. Panels A, B, and C in Table 3 report associated regression results.
First, focusing on the standard pecking order regression (1), there appears considerable di¤erence in the magnitude of estimated b po among di¤erent …rm-size, …rm-growth, and …rm-leverage groups. This result indicates that …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage are in ‡uential factors for debt …nancing decisions. For subsamples grouped by …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverages, we …nd the largest estimated b po is in the group of large-sized …rms at 0:81, the high-growth …rms at 1:02, and the low-leveraged …rm at 1:22. These results are fairly consistent with what have been reported in the pecking order literature (see Frank and Goyal (2003) ). In more detail, similar to previous studies that often argue there is very little support for the pecking order theory in small-size …rms, we …nd b po = 0 for the group of small-sized Chinese …rms. In addition, capital structure studies (not limited to the pecking order studies) suggest that …rms are expected to have "reverting" …nancing behavior towards moderate debt levels. 11 The results in panel C provide support for this noted reverting behavior showing that the low-leveraged …rm group (who has previous low level of leverage ) has the highest estimated b po = 1:22, while the high-leveraged …rm group (who has previous high level of leverage) has the lowest estimated b po = 0:72.
To assess whether there is an asymmetric debt …nancing pattern cross di¤erent subsamples, we compare the magnitude of estimated coe¢ cients between b 
Examination on A Hierarchy of Financing Sources
With the results indicating that b po 6 = 1 and the existence of asymmetric debt …nancing behavior, the evidence presented so far does not o¤er much support for the simplest version of pecking order theory which suggests …rms prefer to issue debt but never equity if fund ‡ow de…cit situation arises. This result follows that the pecking order regressions (1) and (2), where debt is considered the exclusive …nancing source, are insu¢ cient to capture Chinese …rm's capital …nancing behavior. In order to fully investigate the issue as to whether Chinese …rms adhere to a hierarchy of …nancing sources, we assess how Chinese …rms allocate three major …nancing sources -retained earnings, debt, and equity, to ful…ll their funding requirement measured by asset growth. To do so, we use the following regression:
where 4T A it ( = T A it T A it 1 ) is the change in (the book value of) total assets for …rm i at period t (measured as the di¤erence in total assets from period t 1 to period t) ; 4RE it ( = RE it RE it 1 ) is the amount retained earnings for …rm i at period t;
is the amount debt issued by …rm i at period t; and 4E it (= E it E it 1 ) is the amount equity issued by …rm i at period t. To have total asset change (4T A it ) expressed as the growth rate format in (3), explanatory variables of 4RE it , 4D it , and 4E it are all measured in relation to the level of total asset at period t 1 (i.e., T A i;t 1 ). With this setting, the estimated coe¢ cients of b RE , b DI , and b EI provide information on the portion of the funding requirement (in total asset growth) that is …nanced by retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue, respectively. If
indicates that the change in funding requirement is exactly matched proportionately by retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue. Regression (3) was used in Watson and Wilson (2002) to examine how companies in the United Kingdom …nance their asset growth and we will refer it as the standard asset growth regression. Since our analysis in the previous section has indicated an asymmetric …rm …nancing behavior in reaction to di¤erent fund ‡ow situations, in the following analysis we will further run our data on a modi…ed asset growth regression where we partition the standard asset growth regression (3) into cases with fund ‡ow de…cit and with fund ‡ow surplus:
We refer regression (4) as the modi…ed asset growth regression. In regression (4), the ranking on the size of estimated coe¢ cients among b 
Descriptive Statistics
Prior to the regression analysis, Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for % changes in total assets, and in …nancing sources (including retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue) for the full sample and the subsamples. To facilitate the examination on a potential relation between the fund ‡ow condition and the relative changes in three …nancing sources among di¤erent …rm groups, the last column of Table 4 compiles the data of fund ‡ow de…cit.
The results for the full sample show that Chinese companies, as a whole, have a mean of annual total asset growth rate of 14:66% (See results in [.] ). To make fair comparison on the size of % change in retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue in di¤erent subsamples, we scale % changes in these three …nancing sources by % change in total assets. With this scaling, the results for the full sample shows that corresponding to 1% growth in total assets, the debt issue has the highest increment at the average of 0:67%, followed by the equity issue of 0:15%, and the retained earnings of 0:02%.
The results for the subsample grouped by …rm size indicates that both % changes in debt and equity vary negatively with respect to …rm size: The small-sized …rms have a highest % changes in debt and equity of 0:77% and 0:26%, respectively, followed by the medium-sized …rms at 0:67% and 0:15%, respectively, and the large-sized …rms at 0:63% and 0:10%, respectively. Similar to the …nding for …rm size, the results for the subsample grouped by …rm growth show that both % changes in debt and equity vary negatively with respect to …rm growth. For the subsamples grouped by the level of …rm leverage, the results show that the level of leverage is positive associated with % change in debt but negative associated with % change in equity. These results from subsamples suggest the level of …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage are important factors for the observed variation in change in …nancing sources.
For this paper's particular interest, the most important observation from Table 4 is that there are consistent results suggesting a pattern that the …rm group with smaller fund ‡ow de…cit level tends to end up with larger change in both debt and equity. The results in the last two rows of Table 4 support the pattern showing that when the full sample is divided into two subsamples based on the fund ‡ow condition, the …rm group with fund ‡ow surplus at $212:66 has a larger % change in both debt and equity of 0:90% and 0:22%, respectively, than the …rm group with fund ‡ow de…cit at $172:69 of 0:62% and 0:13%, respectively. This negative relation between the level of fund ‡ow de…cit and % change in both debt and equity can also be seen in subsamples grouped by both …rm size and …rm growth. For example, the large-sized …rms have the largest fund ‡ow de…cit at $35.58, followed by medium-sized …rm at $23.35, and small-sized …rm at -$5.35. Their associated % changes in debt and equity have the smallest level at 0:63% and 0:10%, respectively, for large-sized …rms, followed by 0:67% and 0:15%, respectively, for medium-size …rms, and by 0:77% and 0:26%, respectively, for small-sized …rms.
Overall, results in Table 4 suggest that in addition to the level of …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage, …rm's fund ‡ow condition appears to be a key determinant for its decision on the relative usage of …nancing sources for the funding of …rm growth. In particular, the result of negative association between the level of fund ‡ow de…cit and the changes in both debt and equity suggests that …rms with less fund ‡ow de…cit tend to utilize not only more of debt issues but also more of equity issues to ful…ll their …nancing requirement. Since both debt and equity issues react to the level of fund ‡ow de…cit in the same direction, what remains unclear is whether …rm prefers debt issues over equity issues (or equity issues over debt issues) for its funding requirement with respect to di¤erent fund ‡ow situation. To identify the hierarchy on …rm's …nancing sources, we next turn our attention to the regression analysis of (3) and (4). Table 5 and Table 6 report associated regression results for the full sample and subsamples, respectively.
Asymmetric Behavior on the Preference towards Equity Financing
For the full sample, the coe¢ cient estimation from the standard asset growth regression (3) are b RE = 0:80, b DI = 0:87, and b EI = 1:72. This result indicates that Chinese companies, as a whole, use equity issues most extensively to …nance …rm growth. The preference of equity issues over both retained earnings and debt issues are clearly indicated by the fact that the size of b EI is approximately twice as large as both b RE , and b DI .
What condition may contribute to this observed …rm behavior of preferring equity issues for …rm growth? Our further analysis from the modi…ed asset growth regression (4) shows that the condition of whether a …rm experiences fund ‡ow surplus matters to this particular …nancing behavior. Speci…cally, focusing on the result for the cases with fund ‡ow surplus, we …nd that equity issues are overwhelmingly preferred over both retained earnings and debt issues (b Table 5 is that Chinese companies, as a whole, do not follow the pecking order theory to exhibit the …nancing behavior of b RE > b DI > b EI . Instead, their …nancing behavior exhibits a clear tendency of b EI > b DI . Further, such tendency of preferring equity over debt …nancing intensi…es with the condition of fund ‡ow surplus but subsides with the condition of fund ‡ow de…cit.
Regression results for subsamples reported in Table 6 further con…rms the pattern that Chinese …rms prefer to issue equity over debts for …rm growth. We see this pattern arises when making comparison on the size of estimated coe¢ cients between b DI and b EI in regression (3) for all subsamples. We note that in all nine subsamples (with an only exception of low-growth …rms subsample), the estimated coe¢ cients showing a pattern of b EI > b DI . Also, we see the extent on the pattern of b EI > b DI varies among subsamples. In more details, the pattern of b EI > b DI is most pronounced in the group of small-size …rms (b EI = 1:21, and b DI = 0:38) , high-growth …rms (b EI = 2:16, and b DI = 0:90), and high-leverage …rms (b EI = 2:67, and b DI = 0:67) among subsamples grouped by …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage, respectively. We regard this result as the evidence that …rm characteristic a¤ects the degree of …rm's …nancing preference on equity over debt issues. The characteristic of a …rm group is generally plausible for its …nancing hierarchy estimated by regression (3). For example, among all subsamples, the high-leverage …rm group has the strongest pattern of b EI > b DI showing that funding requirement for …rm growth is …nanced at a 4 : 1 ratio between equity issues and debt issues. This result is plausible based on the fact that high-leverage …rms may have painfully high debt ratios, thus they prefer to add much of equity but little debt for their …nancial need.
Most importantly, in all eight (out of nine) subsamples where the pattern of b EI > b DI is identi…ed in the standard asset growth regression (3), their corresponding results from the modi…ed asset growth regression (4) reveal a stylized "asymmetric" capital …nancing behavior. The …rm attitude of favoring equity over debt …nancing is asymmetric to its fund ‡ow condition: The pattern of b EI > b DI is much stronger when there is fund ‡ow surplus than there is fund ‡ow de…cit. We use the regression results for the group of small-size …rms to demonstrate the noted asymmetric …nancing behavior. For small-size …rms, estimates from regression (3) (which does not consider the …rm's fund ‡ow condition) identi…es the …nancing hierarchy as equity issue …rst, then retained earnings, and the last debt issues (i.e., b EI > b RE > b DI ). With the fund ‡ow condition being added to the consideration, estimates from regression (4) show that cases with fund ‡ow surplus end up with the same …nancing hierarchy of b All in all, results in Table 6 provide a clear picture on the capital …nancing choices among Chinese …rms towards funding …rm growth. The evidence suggests that the fund ‡ow condition does have critical impact on …rm's capital …nancing choices. With fund ‡ow surplus, …rms choose to issue a lot more equity than debt to …nance their growth. The considerable extent on the pattern of b ). These six subsamples are small-size …rms, medium-size …rms, medium-growth …rms, low-leverage …rms, medium-leverage …rms, and high-leverage …rms. Firms in the other two subsamples, large-size …rms and high-growth …rms, remain to have equity issues as the dominating …nance source for …rm growth.
The asymmetric capital …nancing behavior in reaction to fund ‡ow condition is apparent when the estimates from regression (4) under cases of fund ‡ow surplus and cases of fund ‡ow de…cit are compared. . Consequently, we note that it is …rm's strong preference on equity …nancing under fund ‡ow surplus (but not de…cit) situation contributes to the overall …nancing hierarchy of b EI > b DI . Another point to make is the capital …nancing behavior among Chinese …rms shows a complete deviation from what the pecking order theory would have expected. In all subsamples (except low-growth …rms), we see no result indicating that …rm used either more of debt issue or retained earnings (i.e., internal funding) than equity issue to …nance their growth regardless of the fund ‡ow condition.
Discussion
We have identi…ed two types of asymmetry in Chinese …rm's capital …nancing behavior in reaction to fund ‡ow condition. The …rst type of asymmetric behavior shows that …rms issue more debts under fund ‡ow de…cit than retire debts under fund ‡ow surplus. More speci…cally, our analysis from the modi…ed pecking order regression (2) indicates that …rms choose to entirely …nance their de…cits by issuing debts when there is fund ‡ow de…cit but retire very little debt when there is fund ‡ow surplus. The second type of asymmetric behavior is the …rm attitude of favoring equity over debt …nancing (for …rm growth) is much stronger under fund ‡ow surplus than under fund ‡ow de…cit. More speci…cally, our analysis from the modi…ed asset growth regression (4) reveals that …rm choose to issue overwhelmingly more equity than debt under fund ‡ow surplus but issue similar amount of equity and debt under fund ‡ow de…cit.
The two noted asymmetric …nancing behavior are found to exist in all of the subsamples (except lowgrowth …rms) grouped by three di¤erent …rm characteristics, including …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage. We therefore argue that the stylized asymmetric …nancing behavior is independent from the …rm characteristics and Chinese …rms' fairly homogenous reactions in …nancing choices to fund ‡ow condition contribute to the asymmetric …nancing patterns observed in the full sample. In addition to the asymmetric capital …nancing behavior to fund ‡ow condition, the evidence also indicates a "universal"attitude of favoring equity …nancing over both debt and internal …nancing, which is found to exist across di¤erent …rm groups with di¤erent …rm characteristics.
What role does the …rm characteristic and the fund ‡ow condition each play in the Chinese …rm's capital …nancing choices? In the literature, …rm characteristics are typically found to be useful in explaining the observed variations on the relative usage of major …nancing sources among di¤erent …rm groups. Consistent with the literature, in this paper we …nd that the …rm characteristics can help explain the variations in the degree of Chinese …rm's "universal" capital …nancing preference towards equity issues. For example, the evidence indicates that both the high-leverage and the low-leverage …rm groups choose to use equity as the priority …nancing source, but this attitude of favoring equity …nancing is much stronger in the high-leverage …rm group than in the low-leverage …rm group. This result is readily plausible in that the high-leverage …rms are more likely to have uncomfortably high debt ratio and consequently they tend to use equity …nancing more extensively than the low-leverage …rms. Following this rationale, …rm characteristics are presumably the …rst set of factors for Chinese …rms to decide on their capital …nancing choices. Depending on its status on the …rm size, …rm growth, and …rm leverage, the …rm decides on what degree of preference on equity …nancing (relative to debt and internal …nancing) is appropriate to pursue. Accordingly, the …rm forms its baseline attitude on the capital …nancing choices based upon the …rm characteristics. Yet, the …rm would have to adjust its baseline …nancing choices from time to time according to the changing fund ‡ow condition it faces. The reason for this adjustment is that the change in fund ‡ow condition can critically in ‡uence the …rm's ability in pursuing the preference on equity issues.
In general, the …rm's decision on the extent of new equity issues depends on the potential price it can receive from investors. In pricing the …rm's new stock issues, investors rely on any information that helps to form their expectation about the …rm's future prospects. We argue that the …rm's fund ‡ow condition is informative about the …rm's future prospects: The investors view the fund ‡ow surplus as positive news to the …rm's future prospects, while the fund ‡ow de…cit as negative news. As a result, the …rm expects to receive better price for its new equity issues when facing the fund ‡ow surplus than the fund ‡ow de…cit.
Given that Chinese …rms have a universal preference towards equity issues, their …nancing choice for funding requirement would always be equity issues …rst. Debt issues would not be considered unless the equity …nancing is practically infeasible (or insu¢ cient) to meet the funding requirement. In other words, the …rm's decision on the extent of debt issues is contingent to how much it can pursue the preference of equity issues. When the …rm faces fund ‡ow de…cit, its ability to pursue preference on equity …nancing subsides given that it is likely to receive unfavorable (or bad) price for the new stock issues. This situation leads to the observation that both equity and debt issues are used to a similar extent to fund …rm growth as the …rm downplays the attitude of favoring equity issues under fund ‡ow de…cit. To the contrary, when the …rm faces fund ‡ow surplus, expectation on the favorable price to be received on new stock shares issued allows the …rm to fully pursue the preference on equity …nancing. This situation explains why we observe overwhelmingly larger extent in equity issues than debt issues for funding requirement under the fund ‡ow surplus. It evidences that Chinese …rms prefer equity …nancing and the situation of fund ‡ow surplus further facilitates this preference.
In summary, the evidence indicates that Chinese …rms have exhibited the universal preference to …nance …rm growth by issuing equity over debt, regardless of whether there is di¤erence in the …rm characteristics. Further, the fund ‡ow condition is a deciding factor for the …rm to change this universal preference on equity …nancing either to a larger extent if under fund ‡ow surplus or to a smaller extent if under fund ‡ow de…cit. Finally, we can use this stylized asymmetric capital …nancing behavior to explain what speci…c …rm action contributes to the observation that the …rm group with higher fund ‡ow de…cit ends up with higher debt-toequity ratio (associated statistics are presented in Table 1 ). As discussed earlier, the increase in fund ‡ow de…cit limits the …rm's ability to pursue the preference on equity …nancing. Consequently, the worsening fund ‡ow condition forces the …rm to issue fewer equity, which makes equity issue along is insu¢ cient to ful…l the funding requirement. This situation in turn forces the …rm to issue more debt. It is therefore clear that the increase in debt-to-equity ratio is the result of the …rm changing both its debt and equity issues to react to the increase in fund ‡ow de…cit. A relevant point to make is the Chinese …rm's …nancing behavior on the amount of debt issues deviates completely from what is predicted by the pecking order theory. The pecking order theory predicts that there is a dollar-to-dollar direct impact from the …nancial de…cit to the debt issue. Deviating from this prediction, the Chinese …rm's …nancing behavior shows that the fund ‡ow condition only has direct impact on the amount of equity issue. It is this direct impact on the amount of equity issue "indirectly" a¤ects the amount of debt issue.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the …nancing behavior of Chinese companies using data from 1,217 publicly traded companies listed in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering the period of 1994 to 2006. The evidence indicates that the capital …nancing behavior of Chinese …rms deviates substantially from the well-known pecking order theory which predicts the …rm prefers to issue debt but never equity if the fund ‡ow de…cit situation arises and the …rm prefers internal to external …nancing, and debt to equity if it issues securities.
Starting with the analysis on the standard pecking order regression, we …nd that there is little support for a dollar-to-dollar impact from fund ‡ow de…cit to debt issue. This result gives indication that besides debt, other …nance sources are used by the Chinese …rms to meet their funding requirement when facing fund ‡ow de…cit and that the pecking order theory is insu¢ cient to capture the Chinese …rm's capital …nancing behavior. To investigate whether the Chinese …rms adhere to a hierarchy of …nancing sources, including retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue, to meet their funding requirement, we next run analysis on the asset growth regression that gives estimates on the portion of the asset growth that is …nanced by each of the three …nancing sources. The results show that equity issues are always the preferred …nancing source over both retained earnings, and debt issues, for funding requirement. It is important to note that the attitude of favoring equity issues emerges as the "universal" phenomena among Chinese …rms, regardless of whether there is di¤erence in their …rm characteristics. Further evidence shows that although the …rm characteristics and the fund ‡ow condition are both important for the decision on the relative usage of …nancing sources, ultimately Chinese …rms use the fund ‡ow condition as the deciding factor for their capital …nancing choices. The condition of whether the …rm experiences fund ‡ow de…cit or surplus a¤ects …rm's decision on how much it can pursue the noted universal preference on equity issues.
The important role of fund ‡ow condition in capital …nancing choices resides upon its potential in ‡uence on the price that is expected to be received on the new stock shares issued. The occurrence of fund ‡ow de…cit gives investors negative view on the …rm's future prospects, which in turn lowers the …rm's expectation on the price for the new stocks issued. Accordingly, the fund ‡ow de…cit limits the …rm's ability to pursue its given …nancing preference on equity issues. We thus observe that both debt and equity issues are used to a similar extent to …nance …rm growth when there exists fund ‡ow de…cit. On the other hand, the investors welcome the occurrence of fund ‡ow surplus and regard it as good news for the …rm's future prospects. Expecting good price to be received on the new stock shares, the …rm fully peruses its given …nancing preference on equity issues. We thus observe that the equity are issued way more extensively than the debt to …nance …rm growth when there exists fund ‡ow surplus.
In conclusion, evidence presented in this paper suggests that Chinese …rms have acted on their preference towards equity …nancing regardless of whether there is fund ‡ow de…cit or surplus situation. The observed asymmetric capital …nancing pattern -much more equity issues are used over debt issues under fund ‡ow surplus than under fund ‡ow de…cit, is the result of Chinese …rms selecting the degree of inherent equity-issue preference that is feasible to pursue based on its fund ‡ow condition. the exact definitions of retained ratio, equity ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio. Also see footnote 10 for the definition of fund flow deficit. Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, and ** 1%, and 5% significance levels, respectively. For ease in comparison, we scale statistics of % change in total assets, % change in retained earnings, % change in debt issue, and % change in equity issue by % change in total assets. The initial statistics of these variables without such scaling are reported in [.] . No. of observations with fund flow surplus 3635
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
